Planning and Approval of the Raid
Activities of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Toward the Branch Davidians
Report House of Representatives
104th Congress, 2nd Session, Union Calendar No. 395
August 2, 1996
III. Planning and Approval of the Raid
The ATF had a variety of options in the manner in which it could
have served the arrest and search warrants on Koresh. These options
included luring Koresh off the Davidian residence, arresting Koresh
while he was off the Davidian property, surrounding the Davidian
residence and waiting for Koresh to surrender himself and consent to the
search, and executing a ``dynamic entry'' style raid into the residence.
The ATF chose the dynamic entry raid, the most hazardous of the options,
despite its recognition that a violent confrontation was predictable.
The decisions regarding the raid were made without the participation of
either Secretary of the Treasury Lloyd Bentsen or the Deputy Secretary
of the Treasury Roger Altman.
a. was ``show time'' even necessary?
The subcommittees received evidence of numerous opportunities to
arrest Koresh away from the residence, thereby reducing the likelihood
of violence. The failure to make use of these opportunities raises the
question of the dynamic entry's necessity. ATF officials offered at
least three different reasons for this critical decision.
ATF Special Agent Phillip Chojnacki, the overall commander of the
raid, testified that Koresh could not be arrested outside the residence
because the intelligence from the undercover house was that he rarely
left the residence.\38\ ATF did not want the tactical problem of having
agents on standby indefinitely while they waited for the rare occurrence
of Koresh going into town.
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\38\ Hearings Part 1 at 416.
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Yet the testimony before the subcommittees revealed that Koresh left
the Davidian residence at least once a week during January and
February.\39\ David Thibodeau, who lived at the Branch Davidian
residence but did not consider himself to be a member of the Branch
Davidian religious community, testified that Koresh was a regular
jogger.\40\ It was also revealed during the trial that Koresh had left
the residence on January 29, 1993, to conduct business at a machine
shop.\41\ Finally, the manager at the Chelsea Bar and Grill in Waco
stated that they served Koresh about once a week through February.\42\
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\39\ Id. at 123.
\40\ Id.
\41\ Id. at 124.
\42\ Id.
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ATF agents next explained that it did not make practical sense to
arrest Koresh outside because he would immediately be released and would
be back at the residence. The window was simply too narrow.\43\ This
answer also lacked credibility since Federal law provides that the
arrestee can be held for 3 days upon motion of the government.\44\
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\43\ Id. at 309-312.
\44\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142(f).
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Finally, ATF officials testified at the hearings that they abandoned
the idea of trying to arrest Koresh outside the residence because their
primary goal was to get inside to conduct a search. These officials
maintained that it was preferable to attack the residence by surprise
and get Koresh and the guns at the same time.\45\ However, the ATF had
developed its own scheme to lure Koresh off the complex. The ruse was
proposed to Joyce Sparks, the social worker who had conducted an earlier
child protection investigation at the Branch Davidian residence. Sparks
was to contact Koresh, who she had come to know relatively well, and
make an appointment with him to be held in her office. While Sparks
agreed to cooperate with the ATF, Sparks' supervisor refused to approve
the ruse tactic.\46\
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\45\ Hearings Part 1 at 221-222.
\46\ Id. at 595.
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b. was the violent outburst predictable?
The record of the subcommittees' investigation shows that persons
who through contact and experience became familiar with the belief
system and the authoritarian structure of the Branch Davidians could
have predicted a violent resistance by the Davidians to a mass law
enforcement action. The Branch Davidians predicted a violent apocalypse,
a vision that followers believed be necessary to go to heaven.\47\
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\47\ James D. Tabor & Eugene V. Gallagher, Why Waco? 7-10 (1995).
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The ATF investigative agents interviewed Sparks, who had kept lines
of communication open between Koresh and herself even after the end of
her Child Protective Services investigation. During their conversations,
Koresh would often provide lengthy presentations of his religious
beliefs. Sparks developed an understanding of how Koresh thought and how
he was viewed within the Branch Davidian group at the residence. When
ATF sought her opinion about the raid, she stated that the Branch
Davidians believed that Koresh was the Lamb of God and that they would
protect him to the death. ``They will get their guns and kill you,''
Sparks recalls saying.\48\
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\48\ Hearings Part 1.
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The ATF also received information from Marc Breault, a former Branch
Davidian and resident at Mount Carmel, the Davidians' home.\49\ Contact
between ATF and Breault was made during December 1992. During that time
and up to the time of the raid, the former Branch Davidian provided
information about the Davidians and Koresh in particular, including his
past correspondence. In a paper prepared by Breault and provided to the
ATF, a recent history of the Branch Davidians recounts the group's views
that the world will end in a final violent battle.
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\49\ U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, Report of the Department of the
Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Investigation
of Vernon Wayne Howell also known as David Koresh 29 (1993) [hereinafter
Treasury Department Report].
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c. the predisposition to dynamic entry
An examination of ATF's timeline in the Waco investigation and raid
planning activities reveals that planning for a military style raid
began more than 2 months before undercover and infiltration efforts even
began.
1. The source of the predisposition
a. The culture within the ATF
Management initiatives, promotional criteria, training, and a broad
range of other cultural factors point to ATF's propensity to engage in
aggressive law enforcement. Senior officials from other law enforcement
agencies have commented on the ATF raid. Several have informed the
subcommittees that their organizations would not have handled the
execution of the Branch Davidian search warrants in the aggressive way
chosen by ATF.\50\ For example, Jeffrey Jamar, the FBI Special Agent-in-
Charge of the Waco standoff, was asked about the FBI's approach to such
a circumstance. He stated that he ``would not have gone near the place
with 100 assault weapons.'' \51\
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\50\ Investigation Into the Activities of Federal Law Enforcement
Agencies Toward the Branch Davidians (Part 3): Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Crime of the House Committee on the Judiciary and the
Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal
Justice of the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. 300 (1995) [hereinafter Hearings Part 3].
\51\ Id.
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b. The Waco Tribune-Herald's ``Sinful Messiah''
One factor affecting ATF's decision to employ a dynamic entry was
the impending release of a newspaper story about Koresh and the
Davidians which revealed the Federal law enforcement investigation then
underway. The Waco Tribune-Herald had planned to release a series of
articles on David Koresh in early 1993.\52\ Fearing publication of the
article, ATF hastened its plans to serve the arrest and search warrant.
It was unclear, however, how Koresh would react to the story. In fact,
ATF Special Agent Robert Rodriguez suggested that the newspaper article
did not upset Koresh.\53\
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\52\ Treasury Department Report at 67-68.
\53\ Hearings Part 1 at 757, 805.
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2. Raid approval and lack of Treasury Department oversight of ATF
Testimony received during the hearings established that there was no
process through which Treasury Department officials were able to review
pending ATF matters prior to their reaching a crisis stage. In the
investigation of Koresh, there was no oversight by Treasury over the
ATF's planning and execution of the raid until approximately 48 hours
before the raid occurred.\54\ Testimony revealed that, even though
Bentsen had been Treasury Secretary for approximately 1 month at the
time of the ATF raid, and Altman had been serving as Deputy Secretary
for the same time period, ATF Director Steven Higgins had never met
either of them, let alone briefed them regarding the investigation and
planned raid. This point was established at the hearings during the
questioning of Higgins by Representative Ed Bryant.
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\54\ Id. at 519-520.
Mr. Bryant: When did you first meet with the Secretary to
discuss anything about your agency, the ATF?
Mr. Higgins: I don't remember any briefings with the
Secretary. I haven't gone back to look at my documents. Probably
in that first month, month and a half, I don't remember any
meetings with him. The only interaction we really had during the
transition would have been with Mr. Simpson.
Mr. Bryant: Are you saying that you never had met with
Secretary Bentsen prior to this point?
Mr. Higgins: I can't remember having gone to a staff meeting
while he was there . . . I don't remember specifically today
having been at one with him.
Mr. Bryant: Had you ever met with his deputy, Mr. Altman,
before this raid?
Mr. Higgins: I don't believe I knew Mr. Altman until then. I
knew who he was, obviously.
Mr. Bryant: Well, I am a little confused here. You are saying
that you were the director of the ATF, which we all know is very
significant, powerful element of the Department of Treasury, and
you had not met with your ultimate boss, the Secretary, for 30
days or so?
Mr. Higgins: I don't believe so, other than maybe to shake
hands, and I don't even remember doing that. It is interesting
that those who think there is some giant conspiracy in the
government don't realize how little we knew each other.\55\
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\55\ Id. at 566.
Under Congressman Bryant's further questioning, Higgins testified that
there was no procedure in place for the director of the ATF to apprise
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the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of the ATF's plans.
Mr. Bryant: Was there any process or procedure available to
you as the Director of the ATF to brief either the Deputy or the
Secretary?
Mr. Higgins: I could have called them and said, yes, I would
like to brief you on something. I think they were accessible,
yes.
Mr. Bryant: But there was no routine process? This was no
regularly done at that point?
Mr. Higgins: No routine process, although most secretaries at
some point set up a system where there is a regular, either
every week or every 2 weeks, meeting with bureau heads.\56\
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\56\ Id. at 566-567.
The testimony before the subcommittees consistently depicted a
Treasury Department that treated ATF as its lowest priority. Department
officials repeatedly demonstrated a lack of interest in even major ATF
actions, such as that of February 28, 1993. The Department maintained a
culture that perceived law enforcement as, at best, a peripheral part of
its mission, according the ATF correspondingly little attention. This
point was brought out during the hearings through questioning by
Representative Bill McCollum, co-chairman of the subcommittees, of
former Treasury Secretary Bentsen about his knowledge of the raid prior
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to February 28, 1993.
Mr. McCollum: When did you first learn of the raid or any plan
for that raid?
Mr. Bentsen: I was in London at my first meeting with G-7 with
the Ministers of Finance and was very much involved in that one.
I came back, to the best I can recall, some time early Sunday
morning on a night flight from London, and in turn I did not
find out about the raid, to the best of my memory, until early
Sunday evening and that is the first knowledge I had of it at
all.
Mr. McCollum: In other words, there was no discussion with
you, no information passed to you prior to the time of the raid
that it was anticipated or that it might exist or any nature----
Mr. Bentsen: That is correct.
Mr. McCollum: Isn't it a little surprising one of the largest
or one of the largest raids in the BATF's history was taking
place, and the Secretary of the Treasury, the chief of all of
the law enforcement of the ATF was not notified?
Mr. Bentsen: I can well understand when I was abroad attending
an international meeting involving questions of monetary
exchange rates and some very serious subjects at that point,
that others within the Department were handling the situation.
Mr. McCollum: But didn't you keep in contact with your office
during the time you were over there? Weren't there telephone
calls?
Mr. Bentsen: Of course.
Mr. McCollum: Nobody in the law enforcement division thought
you ought to be disturbed about this incident and asked about
it. I understand.\57\
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\57\ Id. at 515-516.
Bentsen's responses reveal that throughout the planning of the raid,
including the critical days just prior to its initiation, the Treasury
Secretary knew nothing about it. Neither he nor his deputy knew anything
about an imminent law enforcement raid--one of the largest ever
conducted in U.S. history--being managed by his Department, which would
endanger the lives of dozens of law enforcement agents, women, and
children.
Other testimony from the hearings further demonstrated insufficient
oversight by Treasury Department officials of ATF planning. At the
hearings before the subcommittees, Representative McCollum questioned
Christopher Cuyler, who in February 1993 was the ATF's liaison to the
Treasury Department. Cuyler testified that no Treasury officials had
knowledge about the potential for the raid until February 26--2 days
before the raid was initiated.\58\
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\58\ Id. at 516.
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The inadequate oversight of the ATF by Treasury Department officials
was further evidenced in the final communications between Treasury and
ATF in the day before the raid. The Department maintains that it
conditioned the raid on ensuring the element of surprise was preserved.
As stated in the Treasury Department Report, Department officials
assured that those directing the raid were under express orders ``to
cancel the operation if they learned that its secrecy had been
compromised. . . .'' \59\ Yet, ATF officials, including Higgins, Cuyler,
and the agents in charge of the raid testified that it was not at all
clear to them that Treasury wanted the raid canceled if the element of
surprise was lost.\60\
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\59\ Treasury Department Report at 179.
\60\ Hearings Part 1 at 562, 563.
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d. failure to comply with ``sensitive-significant'' procedures
As noted in the Treasury Department Report, the Koresh investigation
was classified as ``sensitive'' and ``significant'' within a week of its
formal initiation on June 9, 1992.\61\ Such a classification is designed
to ensure a higher degree of involvement and oversight from both the ATF
Special Agent in charge and ATF headquarters, yet this designation was
ignored in practice. In view of this designation, the lack of knowledge
on the part of the Special Agent in Charge and ATF Headquarters
throughout the investigation, including the undercover operation, is
striking. The ``sensitive/ significant'' designation makes ATF's failure
to have implemented a process for continually reviewing intelligence and
modifying plans accordingly a glaring omission.
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\61\ Treasury Department Report at 24.
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e. findings concerning the planning and approval of the raid
1. The subcommittees conclude that the ATF was predisposed to using
aggressive, military tactics in an attempt to serve the arrest and
search warrant. The ATF deliberately choose not to arrest Koresh outside
the Davidian residence and instead determined to use a dynamic entry
approach. The bias toward the use of force may in large part be
explained by a culture within ATF.
2. The ATF did not attempt to fully understand the subjects of the
raid. The experience of Joyce Sparks, Marc Breault, and ATF undercover
agent Robert Rodriguez demonstrate that persons who spent a reasonable
amount of time with Koresh, even without professional training specific
to persons such as Koresh, understood with some predictability the range
of behaviors that might result from a military style assault on the
Branch Davidians.
3. Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen and Deputy Secretary Roger
Altman acted highly irresponsibly and were derelict in their duties in
failing to even meet with the Director of the ATF in the month or so
they were in office prior to the February 28 raid on the Davidians
residence, in failing to request any briefing on ATF operations during
this time, and in wholly failing to involve themselves with the
activities of the ATF.
4. Senior Treasury Department officials routinely failed in their
duty to monitor the actions of ATF officials, and as a result were
uninvolved in the planning of the February 28 raid. This failure
eliminated a layer of scrutiny of the plan during which flaws might have
been uncovered and corrected.
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