Dissenting Views
Activities of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Toward the Branch Davidians
Report House of Representatives
104th Congress, 2nd Session, Union Calendar No. 395
August 2, 1996
DISSENTING VIEWS OF HON. CARDISS COLLINS, HON. KAREN L. THURMAN, HON.
HENRY A. WAXMAN, HON. TOM LANTOS, HON. ROBERT E. WISE, JR., HON. MAJOR
R. OWENS, HON. EDOLPHUS TOWNS, HON. LOUISE M. SLAUGHTER, HON. PAUL E.
KANJORSKI, HON. CAROLYN B. MALONEY, HON. THOMAS M. BARRETT, HON.
BARBARA-ROSE COLLINS, HON. ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, HON. JAMES P. MORAN,
HON. CARRIE P. MEEK, HON. CHAKA FATTAH, AND HON. ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS
The text of the majority report entitled ``Investigation into the
Activities of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Toward the Branch
Davidians'' is based on 10 days of hearings (July 19-August 2, 1995)
jointly held by the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight's
Subcommittee on National Security, Criminal Justice, and International
Affairs and the Committee on the Judiciary's Subcommittee on Crime.
During those hearings, the committees heard testimony from over 90
witnesses and viewed voluminous photographic, video and documentary
exhibits concerning the events at Waco.
Throughout those hearings, the minority repeatedly insisted that no
new facts or evidence emerged as a result of this extensive
investigation. The majority report proves that basic point.
The text of the report agrees with recommendations and positions
taken as a result of the 1993 Department of Justice and the 1993
Department of the Treasury investigations of the Waco incident. The
report agrees that the tragedy at Waco would not have occurred but for
the criminal conduct and aberrational behavior of David Koresh. The
report also confirms a number of other important points emphasized by
the minority during the hearings: that there was probable cause to issue
warrants to search the premises and arrest David Koresh; that the
military assistance received by ATF did not violate Posse Comitatus;
that planning and intelligence operations prior to the raid were
inadequate; that the Branch Davidians started the fire on April 19,
1993; that Koresh and his followers had ample time to leave the compound
after the fire started; and that the amount of tear gas the FBI used was
far below the quantities that would have been required to cause injury
or death. These are not new discoveries revealed as a result of the
majority's investigation, but previously known findings which the
majority has finally accepted.
While we accept those findings in the majority report that are
largely duplicative of the recommendations contained in previous
Department of Treasury and Department of Justice investigations, we
reject the false assumptions and unfounded allegations raised by the
majority's report. The report is fundamentally flawed in a number of
important areas. In an effort to correct those flaws and provide clarity
to facts obfuscated by the majority report, we in the minority file
these Dissenting Views to address basic factual errors, resolve internal
contradictions, meliorate certain deficiencies and express our
disagreement with certain original recommendations made by the majority
report. Additionally, we wish to express strong disagreement with the
majority's unfair criticism of Treasury Secretary Bentsen and their call
for the resignation of Attorney General Reno.
The majority report suffers from several deficiencies. First, the
findings reached are not supported by the hearing record or other
evidence. The text of the report states that the Davidians started the
fire, however the findings conclude that the evidence is not dispositive
on the question of who started the fire.
Second, the report is internally inconsistent. For example, while
critical of the FBI for failing to consult those outside of its control
during the negotiations, it then commends the FBI for allowing lawyers
representing the Davidians to enter the compound and conduct several
hours of discussions with their clients. Clearly, these attorneys were
not controlled or directed by the FBI. Their efforts to end the standoff
were discussed by the majority report.
Third, the report omits important evidence from the hearings. At no
point does the report discuss the allegations of child physical and
sexual abuse perpetrated by David Koresh. Additionally, the report fails
to mention the riveting testimony of Kiri Jewell who testified at the
hearings concerning Koresh' sexual molestation of her when she was 10
years old. Instead the report dismisses the criminal conduct of David
Koresh by summarily stating the Koresh was not subject to congressional
oversight.
Fourth, the report reflects a willingness to believe Koresh over
Federal law enforcement officers and personnel. For instance, the report
asserts that Koresh's lawyers negotiated a credible surrender agreement.
However, Federal law enforcement personnel on the advice of psychiatric
and linguistic experts determined that the ``agreement'' was a
continuation of prior manipulative stalling tactics. The report ignores
no fewer than four prior instances in which Koresh reneged on promises
that he and his followers would leave the compound. Moreover, the report
ignores that Koresh did not state a time certain for surrender and had
not allowed anyone to leave the compound for 3 weeks prior to the
``agreement'' or 5 days following the agreement.
The majority report criticizes Secretary Bentsen for failing to take
an active role in preraid planning but ignores testimony and evidence
presented at the hearing which conclusively showed that under the
structure that existed at the time, the ATF exercised independence in
planning and implementation of enforcement actions. This structure
existed under several administrations. Secretary Bentsen's post-Waco
order changed the structure to require additional oversight by main
Treasury.
Additionally, the majority report calls for Attorney General Janet
Reno's resignation because of her decision to allow the insertion of CS
tear gas. Attorney General Reno stated during the hearings that the
decision to use tear gas was a difficult one but all those consulted who
had personal knowledge or professional expertise agreed that the use of
tear gas was the only way to compel the Branch Davidians to leave the
compound without use of force or loss of life. Evidence and testimony
during the hearing clearly indicated that the CS tear gas was not
direct, or proximate cause of the ignition or acceleration of the fire.
Evidence conclusively found that the Branch Davidians started the fire.
Therefore, the deaths of the Davidians who remained in the compound
should not be laid at Attorney General Reno's feet. This finding of the
majority squarely contradicts their finding that Koresh was the author
of the events at Waco.
I. Committee Procedural Issues
During and following the Waco Hearings, certain procedural issues
arose which need to be addressed and remedied by the majority of this
committee.
Prior to the hearings, the majority conducted a series of interviews
in Waco, TX. Apparently, these interviews involved surviving members of
the Branch Davidians and other residents of Waco. The minority was not
informed of these interviews, invited to participate or allowed to
review interview notes. The minority first learned of these interviews
from the majority report. During this pre-hearing phase, the minority
was not allowed to participate in the formation of the document request
to the Federal agencies involved. Moreover, contrary to the implications
in the majority report, the majority of this committee did not willingly
grant the witness requests of the minority. In fact, our early witness
requests were summarily rebuffed. The minority of this committee was
only able to obtain witnesses by working with the minority staff of the
Judiciary Committee.
During the hearing, at least two witnesses acknowledged under oath,
that they were contacted by representatives of an outside interest group
prior to their appearance before the panel. One witness testified that
in at least one instance, an employee of the interest group identified
herself as a congressional staffer. We believe that this raises serious
questions of witness tampering by an outside group with congressional
proceedings. During the hearings, we requested that the majority
investigate whether this outside group was operating with the knowledge
or at the behest of the majority staff. To date, the majority has
refused further investigation of these instances of improper witness
tampering.
After the hearings, these practices of exclusion continued. At the
conclusion of the hearings, the majority conducted extensive
investigations and interviews without the knowledge or participation of
the minority. This fact did not come to light until the release of the
report.
Finally, one year after the hearings nothing had changed. On July
11, 1996, the majority released a summary of this report to the press.
This press summary was substantially similar if not identical to the
executive summary contained in the report and contained all
recommendations made by the majority report. On July 12, 1996, Members
and staff of the minority obtained a copy of the report.
This pattern of exclusion of the minority members of this committee
from the production of something that purports to be a committee
document should not be allowed. This practice is a serious departure
from prior practice and from the respect that members of this committee
have held for each other in the past. It serves as dangerous precedent
that should not continue.
II. Factual Background
On February 28, 1993 agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms (ATF) attempted to serve an arrest warrant on David Koresh and
a search warrant on the Branch Davidian compound outside of Waco, TX.
While executing these lawful warrants, the agents were met with a hale
of gunfire. ATF agents Conway C. LeBleu, Todd W. McKeehan, Robert J.
Williams and Steven D. Willis died as a result of gunshot wounds
inflicted during the ambush. In addition to those agents who were
killed, 20 ATF agents were wounded by hostile fire emanating from the
compound. After negotiating a cease fire with the Branch Davidians, the
agents were allowed to remove the bodies of their fallen comrades.
Within hours of the initial shooting, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms requested assistance from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's Hostage Rescue Team. The FBI arrived on the scene of the
shooting within 24 hours. A 51-day standoff between Federal law
enforcement agents and the Branch Davidians led by David Koresh
followed. Between the time of their arrival and the tragic conclusion of
the events, the FBI conducted several hundred hours of negotiations with
Koresh and others within the Branch Davidian Compound. Despite these
efforts, only 14 children and 21 adults left the compound as of March
23.
Between March 23 and April 12, negotiations continued but no one
left the compound. During that period, the FBI held a conversation with
a 6-year-old girl who identified herself as Melissa Morrison. The FBI
negotiator asked Melissa whether she would like to leave the compound.
She replied in the affirmative. The FBI negotiator asked her why she did
not leave. Her response was that she could not leave because ``David
won't let me.'' Melissa died in the fire.
On April 12, the FBI presented its tear gas proposal to Attorney
General Reno. Between April 12 and April 17, the Attorney General
conducted no fewer than eight meetings with military and civilian tear
gas experts to debate the tear gas plan, advantages and disadvantages of
using tear gas in a barricade situation, the properties of the tear gas
chosen and the medical and scientific information concerning the
toxicity and flammability of the type of tear gas proposed and the
effects of tear gas on vulnerable populations such as children, the
elderly and pregnant women. On April 17, the Attorney General approved
the tear gas insertion plan and informed the President of her decision.
On April 19, 1993 the Federal Bureau of Investigation began to
insert tear gas via combat engineering vehicles into the Branch Davidian
compound. However, instead of advising his followers to leave, David
Koresh and other unknown members of the Branch Davidians spread highly
flammable liquids throughout the compound and set fire to the entire
building. Because of the poor construction of the building and the use
of chemical accelerants, the entire compound was engulfed in flames and
completely destroyed within 15 minutes.
In the aftermath of the fire, the bodies of over 70 Branch Davidians
were recovered. According to autopsy reports by the Tarrant County (TX)
Coroner, 30 people died of asphyxiation due to smoke inhalation, 2
people died of injuries resulting from blunt force trauma and 20 people,
including David Koresh and a 20-month-old infant, died of gunshot wounds
inflicted at close range by themselves or others within the compound. Of
the nine Branch Davidians who survived the fire, seven escaped through
openings in the walls and windows of the compound created by the combat
engineering vehicles. The shoes and clothing of several of those who
escaped contained concentrations of gasoline, kerosene and other
flammable liquids.
After the siege, the Texas Rangers conducted an extensive search of
the Branch Davidian compound. They discovered 48 illegal machine guns,
seven illegal explosives of various types, nine illegal silencers and
over 200,000 rounds of ammunition.
A series of indictments were returned against 10 Branch Davidians
between March 30 and July 20, 1993. The indictments contained charges
relating to the ambush of ATF officers on February 28 and various
firearms violations committed between February 1992 and February 1993.
On August 6, 1993, the U.S. Attorney's office in Waco obtained another
superseding indictment from the grand jury combining all previous
indictments into one and added two additional defendants.
On September 9, 1993, Kathryn Schroeder entered a guilty plea to one
count of armed resistance of a Federal law enforcement officer. As a
part of her plea agreement, she agreed to testify against the other 11
defendants. A Texas jury convicted 8 of the 11 Branch Davidian
defendants of various firearm offenses. The convicted defendants
received sentences ranging from 3 to 40 years with 7 of the 8 defendants
serving sentences of 40 years imprisonment.
Several congressional hearings were held which solely or
predominantly addressed the events at the Branch Davidian compound. The
President instructed the Department of the Treasury to conduct a review
of the actions of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms at Waco.
That report, entitled ``Report of the ATF Investigation of Vernon Wayne
Howell, a.k.a. David Koresh'' was released to the public on September
30, 1993. Additionally, the President ordered the Department of Justice
to conduct a review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's actions at
Waco. That report, entitled ``Report to the Deputy Attorney General on
the Events at Waco, TX, February 28 to April 19, 1993'' was released to
the public on October 8, 1993.
Two years after the conclusion of the events at Waco, the Committee
on Government Reform and Oversight, Subcommittee on National Security,
International Affairs, and Criminal Justice and the Committee on
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime held extensive hearings on ``Matters
involving the Branch Davidians at Waco, TX.'' These hearings began on
July 19 and ended on August 2, 1995. During those hearings, the
committees heard testimony from over 90 witnesses and viewed voluminous
photographic, video and documentary exhibits concerning the events at
Waco. Despite the comprehensive nature of this examination, we believe
that no new facts emerged. However, we believe that there are certain
indisputable conclusions which can be reached by reasonable minds
regarding the events that transpired at the Branch Davidian complex in
Waco, TX between February 28, 1993 and April 19, 1993.
III. David Koresh was the Author of the Events at WACO
We agree with the majority's conclusion that the criminal conduct
and aberrational behavior of David Koresh and other Branch Davidians led
to the tragedies that occurred in Waco. We share their judgment that
David Koresh bore the ultimate responsibility for the deaths of 4
Federal law enforcement agents and 80 of his Branch Davidian followers.
Additionally, we note that Koresh should also be held responsible for
the serious gunshot and shrapnel wounds of 20 Federal law enforcement
officers and the nonfirearm associated injuries suffered by 11 Federal
officers.
IV. The Arrest and Search Warrants Were Legally Sufficient
We agree with the majority's finding that the ATF had probable cause
to obtain an arrest warrant for David Koresh and search warrants for the
Branch Davidian compound and the facility known as the ``Mag Bag.''
However, we disagree with the majority's assertion that the affidavit
filed in support of the warrant contained false statements.
The ATF began its investigation of Koresh after receiving complaints
from the McLennan County (TX) Sheriff's Department in May 1992. A deputy
sheriff asked ATF to investigate following a report from a concerned
United Parcel Service driver. The driver relayed his concern about a
recent delivery. In delivering the package, the container in which it
was shipped broke open and revealed suspicious materials including
grenade casings and a substantial quantity of black powder. The driver
relayed that this was not the first package he had delivered to the
compound that caused him concern. Following this conversation, the
deputy learned from neighbors of the compound and other members of the
community that the residents of the compound were constructing what
appeared to be a barracks-type cinder block structure; had buried a
school bus to serve as both a firing range and a bunker; and apparently
were stockpiling arms and other weapons.
Before opening a formal investigation, the ATF agent spoke with
local officials, interviewed gun dealers and searched national firearms
registries to determine if any resident of the compound was licensed as
a firearms manufacturer or dealer. Additionally, the agent searched the
national registry to determine if any resident of the compound was
licensed to own a fully automatic weapon. These searches revealed that
no resident of the compound had registered to manufacture or sell
weapons. Moreover, no resident of the compound was licensed to own a
fully automatic weapon. During these discussions, the ATF agent learned
of the delivery of grenade casings, black powder and large shipments of
firearms.
While initially focusing on the paper trail generated by the weapons
and explosives purchased by Koresh and his followers, the agent
determined that an Arms company had recently shipped a substantial
quantity of AR-15 parts to the ``Mag Bag.'' Although not within the
compound, the ``Mag Bag'' was an automotive repair facility operated by
the Branch Davidians which was situated less than a mile away from the
compound, on the grounds owned by the Branch Davidians. He also learned
that a gun dealer had sold more than a dozen AR-15 lower receivers to
Koresh a few months earlier. As the agent knew from previous
investigations, someone with access to metal milling machines and lathes
and the knowledge to use them could readily convert AR-15 semiautomatic
rifles into fully automatic machine guns (similar to M-16 machine guns),
by obtaining legally available parts. Additionally, the agent learned
that 36 weapons had been sold to Vernon Howell (a.k.a. David Koresh) and
additional weapons had been sold to other persons the agent knew to
reside on the Branch Davidian compound. Moreover, the agent learned that
approximately 65 AR-15 lower receivers reflected in a local gun dealers
records were not present in the inventory. When questioned about this
discrepancy, the dealer claimed that the firearms were being stored at
the house of David Koresh.
The agent obtained further evidence by speaking with one of Koresh's
neighbors who had served in an army artillery unit. The neighbor
reported that since 1992 he had frequently heard spurts of weapons fire
coming from the compound at night, including .50 caliber and automatic
weapons fire. In mid-November a deputy sheriff reported that while on
patrol a few days earlier he had heard a loud explosion at the compound
accompanied by large clouds of gray smoke.
In an attempt to gain additional information about the manufacture
and possession of illegal weapons at the compound, the agent spoke with
several former followers. They confirmed seeing numerous weapons
including grenades, pump shotguns, and AK-47 machine guns. Additionally,
they provided information on the extent that Koresh dominated the lives
of the residents of the compound. Branch Davidians had not only
surrendered monetary assets to Koresh but allowed him to administer
corporal punishment to children as young as 8 months old which often led
to bleeding and severe bruising; permitted him to dictate the
dissolution of marriages; empowered him to forbid married couples to
engage in sexual relations; and authorized him to engage in sexual
relations with all female members of the Davidians including girls as
young as 10 years old.
In January 1993, the agent spoke with David Block, who had been a
Branch Davidian from 1981 through 1992. Block relayed that he had seen
two other Branch Davidians using a metal milling machine and metal lathe
to produce weapons and which can be used to convert legal weapons to
illegal automatic weapons. Block described an arsenal that included .50
caliber rifles, AR-15s AK-47s, several 9mm pistols and three
``streetsweepers''.\1\
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\1\ A ``streetsweeper'' is a 12 gauge, 12 shot, shotgun with a
spring driven drum magazine and folding buttstock. Each time the trigger
is released after firing a shot, the magazine rotates to position the
next shot for firing.
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The findings of this extensive investigation formed the basis of the
agent's statements contained in the affidavit in support of an arrest
warrant for Koresh and a search warrant for the compound and the ``Mag
Bag.'' This affidavit was presented by an Assistant U.S. Attorney to a
Federal Magistrate who determined that the information contained therein
was credible and sufficiently current to issue warrants.
Therefore, while assertions contained in the underlying affidavits
concerning the physical and sexual abuse of children may have been
beyond the scope of the ATF's jurisdiction, it is abundantly clear that
probable cause existed to obtain an arrest warrant for David Koresh and
search warrants for the Mount Carmel compound and the facility known as
the ``Mag Bag.''
Any doubts Koresh or others may have had about the validity of the
warrants should have been expressed through lawful means. However,
instead of challenging the validity of the warrants through the judicial
system, Koresh chose to instruct his followers to open fire on Federal
agents in the lawful execution of their duties
It should be remembered that at the criminal trial of the 11 Branch
Davidians, none of the defense lawyers challenged the validity of the
warrants. A successful challenge by any of the defense attorneys at
trial would have excluded evidence of the firearms and would have been a
major step in acquitting the defendants of the firearms violations.
Therefore, it seems incomprehensible that had such a challenge been
possible, it would not have been mounted by one of the many able
attorneys representing the 11 Branch Davidians. However, no attorney
questioned the validity of the warrants.
Additionally, it should be noted that evidence obtained from the
scene after the fire, conclusively proved that Koresh amassed a huge
cache of weapons and materials to manufacture illegal weapons. Although
much evidence may have been destroyed by the April 19 fire set by the
Davidians, at least 47 fully automatic weapons, which are illegal under
Federal law, were recovered along with seven illegal explosives, several
grenade casings, nine illegal silencers and 200,000 rounds of
ammunition.
In its attack on the validity of the warrants, the majority does not
present any facts that would undermine the integrity of the core
paragraphs of the ATF affidavits establishing probable cause. Instead of
providing testimonial or documentary evidence to challenge the validity
of the warrants, the majority raises the unsupportable implication that
a Federal law enforcement officer made false statements in securing the
warrants. Such an unwarranted and unsupported attack on the credibility
of a Federal law enforcement officer is simply irresponsible.
V. Accelerated Service of the Warrants
We disagree with the majority's assertion that there was no
compelling reason to serve warrants on February 28. After a year long
investigation the ATF had probable cause to believe that Koresh had
amassed a substantial cache of illegal weapons and materials necessary
to manufacture additional illegal weapons. While the particular date is
not significant, it would have been extremely imprudent to wait long
enough for him to amass, manufacture and potentially distribute
additional illegal weapons. Additionally, we should note that the
original raid was planned for March 1. However, on February 27, a local
newspaper began a highly critical seven-part series of articles focusing
on Koresh and the Branch Davidians. The series detailed several
allegations against Koresh of child physical and sexual abuse which
could have potentially exposed him to serious State criminal charges.
Therefore, there was reason to believe that Koresh would expect a
heightened interest from State or Federal authorities following the
conclusion of the series and may have destroyed evidence of the illegal
weapons in anticipation of a search. The date of the raid was moved from
March 1 to February 28.
VI. Military Assistance Did Not Violate Posse Comitatus
We agree with the majority's conclusion that Posse Comitatus was not
violated and share their concerns over the implementation of formal
guidelines and criteria in the nonreimbursable use of Department of
Defense resources in drug cases. However, we are concerned that the
implementation of such a litmus test could result in the denial of
needed assistance in the fight against the importation, production,
distribution and use of illegal drugs. Therefore, although we understand
this concern, we cannot support a recommendation for such guidelines and
criteria when there is no objective evidence to believe that the
military has failed in its role to accurately and appropriately gage the
need of domestic law enforcement agencies for nonreimbursable
assistance. However, it would be appropriate and would not hamper the
fight against illegal drugs if the Department of Defense, the National
Guard and Federal law enforcement agencies developed operational
parameters for determining when a drug nexus is sufficient to justify
nonreimbursable assistance.
Posse comitatus is the statute that limits military participation in
civilian law enforcement. Military personnel may provide training to
Federal, State and local civilians law enforcement officials, as long as
it is not ``large scale or elaborate.'' Such assistance may not involve
DOD personnel in a direct role in law enforcement operations, except in
specific and narrowly drawn circumstances.
The Department of Defense provided minor nonreimbursable assistance
to the ATF in connection with the events at Waco. Under 10 U.S.C. 371
and 32 U.S.C. 112, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to provide
military support to law enforcement agencies engaged in counter drug
operations. The Secretary of Defense is authorized to pay for the
support pursuant to Section 1004 of P.L. 101-510, Section 1088 of P.L.
102-190, and Section 1041 of P.L. 102-484. If a drug nexus does not
exist, the Economy Act requires that as a general matter, reimbursement
is required when equipment or services are provided to agencies outside
the Department of Defense. An exception may be made if there is some
training value to the DOD personnel involved.
In the planning stages of the raid, the ATF requested Special Forces
assistance from the Department of Defense. This request was forwarded
through Operation Alliance and Joint Task Force 6. The initial request
raised legal questions with Special Forces attorneys regarding the
permissible scope of assistance. Specifically, Special Forces Attorneys
were concerned with the proposal for DoD to review the ATF raid plan and
perform on-site medical emergency services. Acceding to such a request
would have clearly violated the Posse Comitatus Act's mandate
prohibiting the military's ``participation'' in civilian law enforcement
activities. Therefore, the initial request was significantly scaled back
and limited to the facilitation of ATF training. The military did not
offer any training involving the specific details of the raid plan or
any advice concerning the accomplishment of the mission. Special forces
provided assistance limited to facilitating ATF training at Fort Hood.
This included helping to construct models of the doors and windows of
the compound; creating a schematic prototype of the compound's exterior;
operating firing ranges for weapons practice and providing limited
training in emergency medial assistance. Additionally, it should be
noted that there is no evidence to suggest that Department of Defense
personnel were present at the time of the raid or at any time during the
siege.
Federal courts have concluded that the National Guard is a State
force which is not subject to the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus
Act, except when called into Federal service, (United States v. Benish,
5 F.3d 20 (1993). While in State militia status, the range of
permissible activities are governed by the laws and constitutions of the
respective States. However, it is possible for a National Guard unit to
become a Federal law enforcement entity. A State National Guard Unit is
``federalized'' when it is called into service by the President to
suppress domestic violence or insurrection against a State government or
the authority of the United States (10 U.S.C. 331-333). When a State
guard unit is ``federalized,'' law enforcement actions taken pursuant to
that status are governed by the provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act.
The Texas and Alabama Air National Guard units provided pre-raid
assistance by conducting aerial reconnaissance to photograph the
compound. They conducted six flights over the compound and the facility
known as the ``Mag Bag'' from January 6 through February 25, 1993. In
addition to the reconnaissance flights, the Texas National Guard
supplied three helicopters for training exercises on February 27 and for
the raid on the following day.
In sum, there is no evidence to suggest that the Posse Comitatus Act
was violated by the Department of Defense. Additionally, the National
Guard units utilized by the ATF were not in a ``federalized'' status and
therefore were not subject to the proscriptions of the act.
VII. Despite Inadequate Intelligence Operations, ATF did not Prematurely
Reject the Siege Option
We disagree with the majority's findings that the primary reason
that the dynamic entry route was chosen was because ATF did not have the
experience, negotiators or capability to conduct a siege of any
significant duration.
Once ATF agents concluded that there was probable cause to obtain
warrants to search the premises and arrest Koresh, attention turned to
the execution of those warrants. Three options were considered (1)
arrest Koresh away from the compound and then serve the warrants; (2)
place the compound under siege and (3) serve the warrants by ``dynamic
entry or raid.''
The first option to arrest Koresh away from the compound followed by
a subsequent service of warrants was rejected after careful
consideration. Contrary to the majority's assertion, the ATF explored
the possibility of arresting Koresh away from the compound. However,
there are two problems with this assertion. The first problem is that it
ignores the fact that a lawful search warrant had to be served for the
premises. There is no reason to believe that the Davidians in the
compound would not have reacted in the same manner had the search
warrant been served without Koresh on the premises or attempted to
destroy evidence if time elapsed between Koresh's arrest and the
execution of the search warrant. Second, as of February 1993 the ATF had
conducted several hundred raids of this kind. There had only been one
case involving prolonged armed resistance. Moreover, Koresh had previous
encounters with the State officials, police authorities and the judicial
system. During these previous encounters, Koresh did not react violently
to searches or service of process. Therefore, neither the agency's
history nor Koresh's personal history yielded any information that would
tend to indicate a violent reaction. It is pure speculation for the
majority to argue that Koresh could have been arrested away from the
compound.
As acknowledged in the Treasury report, ATF failed to collect
sufficient information to determine whether an off-premises arrest of
Koresh could have been achieved. The ATF raid planners made serious
mistakes in the intelligence gathering operations conducted prior to the
raid. Successful intelligence operations require the development of
adequate and accurate information. That information must be distributed
to persons in the organizational hierarchy who are able to recognize the
meaning and limitations of that information.
On January 11, 1993, the ATF began an undercover operation in a
house across the road from the Branch Davidian compound. The agents
involved were given the cover of being students at a local technical
college. However, from the beginning several neighbors became suspicious
of the their activities because the agents appeared too old to attend
the college and the cars they drove were too new to belong to students.
However, even if the ``cover stories'' used by the agents had been
successful, the operations of the undercover investigation itself were
abysmal. They failed to keep accurate logs and failed to turn over the
available logs to raid planners. However, it should be noted that the
agents were given little if any meaningful direction from the raid
planners (Sarabyn and Chojnacki). Therefore, without adequate guidance
from their superiors, the agents were almost destined to fail. Although
Agent Rodrigues obtained a good deal of relevant and reliable
information about Koresh and the Davidians, those agents charged with
the responsibility of surveillance were poorly served by raid planners
Sarabyn and Chojanacki.
Because of this inadequate supervision, the surveillance operation
was not able to determine the frequency of Koresh's departures from the
compound, the routine activities within the compound or other
information that might have been useful in deciding the optimal time,
place and manner to effect service of the warrants.
However, based on the scant information possessed at the time, the
agents concluded that such an arrest was not a viable alternative. They
knew that Koresh's infrequent departures from the compound were
unpredictable. A social worker who had visited the compound to
investigate the health and safety of children present, had informed the
case agent that she thought Koresh did not leave the compound very
often. On February 17, Koresh told the undercover agent that he did not
often leave the compound. Further, it should be noted that after April
19, all reports of Koresh having been seen off the compound were
thoroughly investigated by the Treasury Review. The reviewers were able
to document only isolated trips off the compound, most occurring long
before the time of the raid.
Additionally, it should be noted that prior to the hearing, majority
subcommittee staff spent several days in Waco to gather facts and
interview prospective witnesses. It should be noted that in hearings
that lasted 10 days and had over 90 witnesses, no witnesses who were not
members of the Branch Davidians or lawyers for the Branch Davidians were
produced to testify supporting the majority's present contention that
Koresh left the compound with sufficient frequency to affect an arrest
away from the premises.
As noted in the Treasury report and by several witnesses, a siege
was rejected because of a belief that any protracted encounter with a
heavily armed and philosophically isolated and insular group would not
be likely to produce an optimal result. The majority incorrectly
concludes that the dynamic entry approach was prematurely abandoned. The
decision to pursue a dynamic entry was made during a meeting that took
place between January 27-29, 1993 after surveillance and undercover
operations had begun. Prior to that meeting a siege option was under
active consideration as was the possibility of luring Koresh off the
compound. The Treasury report noted that the surveillance operations
could have been better coordinated and intelligence better utilized in
making this tactical decision. While the Treasury report concluded that
the process used to decide that a dynamic entry should be undertaken was
flawed, a siege option presented its own risks of failure. Four of the
five independent reviewers who addressed the issue found that the
dynamic entry plan could have been successful if surprise had not been
lost.
VIII. Treasury Department Officials Should Have Taken a More Active Role
in Raid Planning
We disagree with the majority's assertion that officials at the
Treasury Department should have taken a more active role in pre-raid
planning. The majority seems to forget that prior to President Clinton
and Secretary Bentsen's order, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms exercised independence in planning and implementation of
enforcement actions. Prior to this failed raid, there was no practice,
history or reason to believe that additional oversight was necessary.
The Treasury Secretary is responsible for the actions of over
165,000 people and numerous bureaus and offices. During his first month
in office, Secretary Bentsen relied on the Department's existing
organizational and operational structure. This structure had been used
by the previous Republican and Democratic administrations. In the
enforcement area, this organizational structure included a chain of
command from the law enforcement bureau head through the Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement to the Deputy Secretary and
then to the Secretary of the Treasury. This structure placed
responsibility on the law enforcement bureau head for bringing
significant matters to the attention of his or her immediate supervisor.
It is unfair, inaccurate and irresponsible to castigate Secretary
Bentsen for the adoption of an organizational structure and operational
approach that had been in place for years.
Under the structure that existed at that time, then ATF Director
Steven Higgins' immediate supervisor was Deputy Assistant Secretary John
Simpson, a career civil servant who had served at Treasury for many
years. Mr. Simpson was carrying out the duties of the Assistant
Secretary for Enforcement, pending the confirmation of an Assistant
Secretary for Enforcement designee Ronald Noble. Having been ATF's
Director for approximately 10 years, Mr. Higgins was very familiar with
the reporting process.
The suggestion that a meeting between Secretary Bentsen and ATF
Director Higgins would have led to earlier notification of ATF's planned
raid of the Branch Davidian compound is pure conjecture. In fact
Director Higgins did not tell his immediate supervisor in Treasury of
the planned raid until 2 days before its planned execution.
IX. The Raid Should Have Been Aborted When the Undercover Agent Reported
That Koresh Knew the Raid Was About to Occur
The majority report errs in concluding that Treasury officials
failed to clearly communicate the conditions under which the raid was to
be aborted. In fact, the Treasury Report and ATF Director Higgins'
testimony before Congress on several occasions made it clear that the
ATF knew it was supposed to call off the raid if Koresh learned that the
ATF had planned a law enforcement operation against them. Director
Higgins never questioned the clarity of his message from the Treasury
Department. He testified that he told his subordinates if anything
looked unusual, the raid should be called off. Consistent with the ATF's
plan, Agent Rodrigues clearly communicated Koresh's awareness of an
impending ATF law enforcement operation to his field supervisors.
Unfortunately, Mr. Sarabyn and Chojnacki failed to heed this clearly
communicated warning. All six of the independent tactical operations
experts who analyzed the ATF's failed raid concluded that based on Mr.
Rodrigues' information, the raid commanders should have called off the
raid.
We concur with the majority's finding that despite their contrary
testimony before this committee, evidence clearly shows that Agents-in-
Charge Sarabyn and Chojnacki understood yet consciously chose to
disregard warnings by Undercover Agent Rodrigues on the morning of the
raid. Rodrigues advised Sarabyn and Chojnacki that the ATF's operations
had been compromised and the element of surprise had been lost. The most
significant mistake was the decision of the on-site raid commander to
proceed after he had been informed by an undercover agent that Koresh
was aware that a raid was about to occur. This error in judgment allowed
Koresh to have an estimated 30-45 minute preparation time prior to the
arrival of the agents. Koresh used this opportunity to arm himself and
his followers. Despite the majority's assertions to the contrary,
Treasury acknowledged in its report that the raid commander was
questioned by the Washington commanders and knew or should have known
that the raid should not have proceeded if secrecy or surprise had been
lost or compromised.
X. The FBI Negotiations and Tactical Operations Were Sometimes
Contradictory
The Department of Justice has acknowledged that there could have
been better coordination and communication between the officials
responsible for tactical decision and the negotiators. Alternating
tactics of negotiating, granting demands and then using tactical
operations such as cutting off electricity to punish Koresh for reneging
on agreements, may have allowed Koresh to increase his hold on his
followers.
In an effort to improve coordination and communication between
negotiators and tactical command in the future, the Department of
Justice has created that Critical Incident Response Group. As a part of
this team, negotiators and tactical personnel train together to
facilitate improved coordination of operations.
However, the majority's main criticism of the FBI involves its
alleged reluctance to use outside experts. This criticism is not valid.
Following the suggestions of behavioral experts, FBI negotiators
repeatedly stressed to Koresh that if he left the compound, he would
have every opportunity to spread his message to a worldwide audience,
that he would be presumed innocent of any wrongdoing with respect to the
ATF raid, and that the judicial process would provide him with an
opportunity to tell his side of the conflict. The FBI negotiated with
Koresh for 51 days. During that course of time, over 36 demands by the
Davidians were documented and granted by the FBI. Contrary to the
majority's assertion, there is no indication that FBI negotiators were
adversely affected by physical or emotional fatigue.
We disagree with the majority's assertions that on the 46th day of
the siege, the FBI should have believed the representations of Koresh's
attorney who relayed Koresh's representation that he and his followers
would leave the compound if Koresh were allowed to write his exposition
on the Seven Seals of the Biblical Book of Revelations. Early in the
siege, Koresh was allowed to speak to religious scholars concerning his
interpretation. In response to a promise to surrender, an audiotape
containing his interpretation of the First Seal was played on a radio
broadcast. However, Koresh did not surrender at that time. FBI
behavioralist Murray Miron believed that this latest attempt was merely
another stalling tactic. Therefore, based on his prior behavior and
manipulative personality, it was not unreasonable for negotiators to
conclude that Koresh would not honor this latest promise. We would note
that had Koresh been interested in surrendering to authorities, he could
have done so at any time during the 51-day siege. During the same
period, 37 of his followers surrendered and called into the compound to
inform Koresh and others that they were being treated well and had not
been hurt. Therefore, whatever compelled Koresh to remain in the
compound and prevented other followers from leaving was not something
that a deal involving Koresh's composition of the written exposition of
his religious tenets would have resolved.
XI. Law Enforcement Officers Could Benefit From Future Use of Outside
Behavioral and Psychological Experts
We disagree with the majority's assertion that the FBI should have
developed a thorough understanding of the religious tenets of the
Davidians. During the course of the negotiations, the FBI attempted this
approach and abandoned it because it became clear that the tenets were
based on Koresh's personal thoughts and rapidly changed to suit the
occasion. Therefore, this would not only have been futile but would have
pushed back the time of the service of the warrants thereby allowing
Koresh to amass even more illegal weapons.
We disagree with the majority assertion that the FBI negotiators did
not appear to recognize the potential benefit of using religious experts
in working with Koresh. We refer the majority to the Department of
Justice report which listed the opinions of independent religious
experts and FBI behavioral experts consulted during the siege. The FBI
solicited and received input from various experts in many fields
including psychology, psychiatry, psycho linguistics, religion and
theology, cult theory and negotiation techniques. Religious experts and
theologians consulted by the FBI included Dr. Philip Arnold of the
Reunion Institute; Dr. Bill Austin, chaplain, Baylor University; Jeriel
Bingham, vice president, Davidian Seventh Day Adventist Association;
Reverend Trevor Delafield, Seventh Day Adventist Church; Dr. Robert
Wallace and Dr. John Fredericks, Lighthouse Mission; Dr. Michael Haynes,
Doctor of Theology and Psychology and Dr. Glenn Hilburn, Dean,
Department of Religion, Baylor University. Additionally, the majority of
those experts concluded that Koresh was manipulative and likely to
deceive. All the experts agreed that Koresh would not leave the compound
voluntarily. Therefore the FBI negotiators tactics which focused on
Koresh as a manipulative and deceitful individual were precisely in
accord with the viewpoint of the religious experts and psychological
experts and with the experience of those negotiators who spent over 400
hours talking to Koresh and his followers.
XII. The Use of Tear Gas Was Unfortunate But Necessary
The majority report suggests that the decision to use gas was not
the only option available to compel the Branch Davidians to leave the
compound. In support of their theory that additional time would have
yielded a nonviolent surrender, the majority report points to the
release of 21 children between February 28 and March 3 as an indication
that continued negotiations would have eventually secured the release of
the remaining 80 adults and children within the compound. They argue
that other options including expansion of and continuation of the
negotiation strategy, waiting for the depletion of food and water
supplies, or waiting for Koresh to complete his written exposition on
the meaning of the Biblical Seven Seals prophesy were prematurely
rejected in an effort to end the confrontation.
However, after March 23, additional releases had not been obtained.
Koresh repeatedly reneged following the FBI's performance of agreed upon
terms. Repeatedly, Koresh would explain his decision to remain in the
compound by saying that God had not yet told him it was time to leave.
Additionally, it should be noted that the ``regular'' conditions within
the compounds were austere (no running water or plumbing) and there was
a vast supply of military style MRE's (meals-ready to eat) and an
artesian well with water storage tank housed within the compound.
Because the FBI decided not to fire any shots during the standoff,
the Davidians walked outside of the building on several occasions to
smoke cigarettes, empty chamber pots, feed chickens and gather water
from rain water runoff. Finally, the large amount of firearms and
ammunition (200,000 rounds) found within the compound, and the gathering
of other interested and potentially dangerous individuals (para-military
and Militia groups) contributed to their concern about the continued
degradation of the situation and their ability to adequately secure the
perimeter of the compound.
In fact, during the standoff two people, not people previously
affiliated with the Davidians, infiltrated the perimeter and entered the
compound. The FBI was concerned that failing to end the standoff would
allow others (particularly para-military militia groups) who had begun
to descend upon the compound to enter the perimeter. Threats posed by
gathering militia and para-military groups in the area increased
security problems and underscored the need for a quick resolution to the
situation. There was a genuine concern as to whether these groups had
gathered as observers or sought to engage in the standoff.
On April 12, the FBI presented its tear gas plan to Attorney General
Reno. Over the ensuing days, several meetings were held to debate the
tear gas plan, the properties of the gas chosen and the effects of gas
on vulnerable populations such as pregnant women and children. Between
the initial presentation of the plan on April 12 and the Attorney
General's April 17 decision to use tear gas, Reno attended no fewer than
eight meetings to discuss the tear gas option. Those meetings were
attended by military and tactical experts who briefed the Attorney
General on the advantages and disadvantages of the use of tear gas in a
barricade situation as well as the available medical and scientific
information concerning the toxicity and flammability of CS tear gas.
CS tear gas is a common riot control agent used in the United States
and Europe. The purpose of tear gas is to cause irritation of the eyes,
skin and respiratory system sufficient to encourage an individual to
leave the premises or any open area. CS is considered the least toxic
agent in the family of chemical tear gas irritants. In order to reach a
level which would be lethal to fifty per cent of the population, CS must
be in concentrations of 25-150 thousand milligrams per minute, cubed.
The CS gas used at the Davidian compound was significantly less
concentrated than the lethal level. The CS gas used was in a
concentration which would only reach 16,000 milligrams per minute
(cubed) if all of the gas used had been released at the same time, in a
single closed room and the residents of that room had been exposed
continuously for 10 minutes. At Waco, CS tear gas was released
throughout different areas of the building while openings were created
in the windows and walls. The CS gas was inserted for a total of 5
minutes over a 6-hour period. A total of twenty CS canisters were
deployed on April 19. Additionally, several commentators discuss the
fact that the wind velocity reached 35 knots during the tear gas
delivery. Therefore, given the amount of tear gas used, the presence of
high winds, building ventilation and the delivery of gas to different
areas of the compound, it is highly unlikely that anything close to the
fifty percent lethality rate was reached.
There are no documented cases in which the use of CS gas caused
death. Reports that Amnesty International linked use of the gas to
deaths of Palestinians in the occupied territories, is an extremely
biased reading of the report. Released in June 1988, the report
discussed the use of two kinds of tear gas, CS and CN. CN gas has proven
to be lethal in closed quarters. The overwhelming majority of evidence
on ill-effects of CS was anecdotal. Medical care had not been sought or
documented. Moreover, because of religious prohibitions autopsies had
not been performed. Therefore, there is no reliable scientific data
which would lead to the conclusion that CS alone was implicated in any
of the deaths. As Physicians for Human Rights found when visiting the
occupied territories ``we could not confirm the reports of deaths from
tear gas inhalations.''
The Himsworth Report, issued by the British Government, found that
there is no evidence of any special sensitivity of the elderly, children
or pregnant women. Additionally, the Himsworth Commission chronicled the
effect of CS gas exposure on one infant and found that the child
recovered rapidly after removal from the area affected by CS tear gas.
This report was supported by a report which appeared in a Medical
journal. The author not only set forth a treatment protocol for children
exposed to CS tear gas but noted that full recovery was highly likely.
Moreover, the majority report contends that the presence of CS gas
may have acted as an accelerant during the fire. That is unlikely. While
CS is combustible (it will burn if ignited, much like paper), it is not
a chemical accelerant or a flammable agent. Additionally, the method of
delivery or the compounds in which the CS particulate was contained
(methylene chloride and carbon dioxide) will not burn and will actually
inhibit fire ignition.
The original CS. insertion plan required that the tear gas be
inserted by CEV's over a course of 2 to 3 days. The theory was that the
gas insertion over several days and in different parts of the compound
would gradually render the entire compound uninhabitable. However,
within 5 minutes of the initiation of the original plan, the insertion
of tear gas was dramatically escalated.
The original gas insertion plan provided that in the event that the
CEV's or others were fired upon during the insertion of gas, that the
insertion would be escalated. The plan vested authority with the SAC
Jamar to make the escalation decision. Therefore, when reports of
shooting coming from the compound were confirmed and it became clear
that the CEV's were being fired upon by the Davidians, Jamar decided to
escalate insertion of the tear gas delivery schedule.
We agree with the majority report that it should have been obvious
to all concerned that the insertion of CS tear gas would have prompted
Koresh to order the vehicles fired upon and that this would have
resulted in the acceleration of tear gas insertion. However, the
majority fails to recognize that if the vehicles were fired upon, the
parties at risk would be the FBI. Following the conclusion of the
insertion of tear gas, the building would be uninhabitable and the
occupants would have evacuated. Therefore, it seems that this
underscores the FBI's determination to compel the occupants to leave
without any loss of life inside the compound, despite potential harm to
themselves.
XIII. White House Officials Were Informed But Not Involved in the
Decision to Use Tear Gas
White House officials were informed but not consulted about the use
of tear gas.
On April 18, Web Hubbell, Justice Department White House Liaison,
and Attorney General Reno informed the President about the plan to
gradually insert tear gas into the compound over a 2 to 3 day period in
an effort to render the compound uninhabitable and compel the occupants
to leave. During that conversation, Reno told the President that April
19 was not envisioned as ``D-Day'' and that the use of the tear gas
would not be the beginning of an assault on the compound.
Critics maintain that the White House pressured Reno to end the
standoff by any means necessary. They contend that this directive led to
the lack of clear decisionmaking and a less than objective examination
of the potential hazards concerning the use of CS gas. The majority
report implies that had expediency not been a factor, Reno would have
continued to wait for the Davidians to surrender. This contention is
pure speculation that is not supported by the facts. As noted earlier,
Attorney General Reno held eight meetings to discuss various aspects of
the tear gas plan with tear gas experts. If speed had been her concern,
she would not have consulted with various experts and waited a week
between the first proposal of the plan and its implementation.
XIV. The Branch Davidians Started the Fire and Chose to Remain Within
the Compound While It Burned
On April 19, approximately 20 minutes after the last tear gas
insertion, the Davidian compound erupted in flames. The first indication
of fire was seen and noted at 12:07 p.m. By 12:11 p.m., the entire
compound was substantially involved.
There is no doubt that the Branch Davidians started the fire. We
disagree with the conclusion of the majority report which states that
the evidence concerning the origin of the fire is not dispositive. The
majority report ignores evidence contained in the arson report which
proved three separate ignition points within the compound and
conclusively found that chemical accelerants were placed throughout the
compound. Additionally, there was eyewitness testimony as well as film
footage which chronicled the rapid spreading of the blaze. Moreover, the
clothes of surviving Davidians who escaped the compound were laced with
gasoline and other flammable materials. Finally, and most poignantly,
several surviving Davidians admitted that those within the compound had
started the blaze. These statements are supported by recorded statements
in which voices are heard asking about the location and timing of fuel
pouring and lighting activities. Additionally, it should be noted that
an examination of the vehicles involved inserting tear gas was
conducted. These vehicles did not have flame throwing equipment and were
not of the type that could have been equipped with flamethrowing
equipment. All evidence clearly indicates that the fire which destroyed
the Branch Davidian compound on April 19 was ignited by individuals
inside the compound.
It should be noted that the fire department was called after the
blaze began. However, they did not attempt to put out the fire because
during the blaze gun shots were heard coming from and within the
compound. The safety of any firefighter who approached the compound
could not be assured. Therefore, the FBI determined that the local
firefighters should not be allowed to approach the compound. However, it
should be noted that after the fire began nine survivors exited the
compound.
There has been some speculation that the tear gas used may have
contributed to the fire. The CS tear gas did not act as an accelerant
for the fire. CS is a powdery particulate. When used in a tear gas
canister or other tear gas delivery system, CS particulate is suspended
in methylchloride and carbon dioxide. Neither CS particulate,
methylchloride or carbon dioxide are flammable. They actually inhibit
the outbreak of fire. We agree with the majority's conclusion that the
use of CS tear gas prior was not a direct, proximate cause or
contributing factor to the rapid ignition and expansion of the blaze.
The audiotape and forensic evidence clearly indicate that the rapid
ignition and spread of the blaze was due to the use of chemical
accelerants (including gasoline, kerosene and camp fuel oil) distributed
throughout the compound by individuals within the compound.
Additionally, the materials used in the construction of the building
itself (largely plywood) in conjunction with storage of materials such
as hay and propane gas containers and high winds combined to
significantly contribute to the rapid combustion of the building.
XV. Recommendations
Finally, the report makes 17 recommendations that are largely
duplicative of recommendations made by the extensive internal reviews
undertaken by the Department of Treasury and the Department of Justice.
Those recommendations and our responses are as follows:
1. Congress should conduct further oversight of the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and jurisdiction should be transferred to
the Department of Justice. While additional oversight is always proper,
it should be noted that the proposal to transfer jurisdiction of ATF
first surfaced in the Carter administration and has been rejected
several times. Rejections have been based on concerns about placing
total enforcement of the firearms laws in one agency. A separation of
investigative and prosecutorial functions in separate agencies maintains
an important check and balance system.
2. If false statements were made in the affidavit filed in support
of the search and arrest warrants, criminal charges should be pursued.
There is absolutely no evidence to suggest that the agent in question
made false statements. This recommendation is an example of a
willingness to disbelieve Federal law enforcement personnel which is
manifest throughout this report.
3. Federal law enforcement should verify the credibility and
timeliness of the information used in obtaining warrants. An assistant
U.S. attorney and a Federal Magistrate reviewed the affidavit and found
the information sufficiently fresh to issue warrants. Additionally, in
finding that probable cause existed, the majority report implicitly
agrees with the determination that the information was not stale.
4. The ATF should revise it National Response Plan to ensure that
its best qualified agents are placed in command and control positions.
The Treasury Department made this finding in its internal review. The
ATF has implemented procedures to comply.
5. Senior officials at ATF should assert greater command and control
over significant operations. The Treasury Department made this finding
it its internal review. The ATF has implemented procedures to comply.
6. The ATF should be constrained from independently investigating
drug-related crimes. This recommendation may lack administrative and
operational feasibility.
7. Congress should consider applying the Posse Comitatus Act to the
National Guard with respect to situations where a Federal law
enforcement entity serves as the lead agency. This recommendation may
lack administrative and operational feasibility and may unduly hamper
the State's
DISSENTING VIEWS OF HON. CARDISS COLLINS, HON.
operations (e.g. drug trafficking patrols, civil disturbance).
8. The Department of Defense should streamline the approval process
for military support so that drug nexus controversies are avoided in the
future. This recommendation may deprive the Department of Defense of the
operational flexibility necessary to provide assistance. The inability
to pass a ``litmus test'' should not preclude the provision of otherwise
justifiable assistance.
9. The GAO should audit the military assistance provided to the ATF
and to the FBI in connection with their law enforcement activities
toward the Br
